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I. INTRODUCTION
The medical malpractice1 crisis came into the public eye in 1975 with
extensive news coverage of striking physicians. Medical malpractice claims
were soaring, resulting in multi-million dollar verdicts and settlements. 2
Increased claims led to higher malpractice insurance premiums, 3 and the
increased premiums forced physicians to pass the cost on to health care
consumers in the form of higher fees.4
The etiology of the medical malpractice crisis is complex. Some experts
attribute the increase in medical malpractice actions to a deterioration
in the doctor-patient relationship.5 Additionally, the phenomenon of
modern science has created increased patient expectations which "result
in a situation where these patients sometimes emerge from hospitals with
legal claims against their physicians for less than perfect outcomes."' The
general increase in claims may also be attributed to individuals becom-
ing more conscious of their personal rights. 7
' Medical Malpractice has become a catchall phrase for various types of suits
arising out of the doctor-patient relationship. See generally Blaut, The Medical
Malpractice Crisis - Its Causes and Future, 44 INS. CouNs. J. 114 (1977) [hereinafter
Blaut].
Multi-million dollar suits are no longer the exceptional case. MODEL PERIODIC
PAYMENT OF JUDGMENTS ACT, Prefatory Note 1 (Discussion Draft 1980)[hereinafter
MODEL ACT] [microfiche].
The American Medical Association indicates that the percentage of physicians
sued in malpractice claims nearly tripled from 1978 to 1983. In 1983, there were
sixteen malpractice suits for every one hundred doctors, which is a twenty percent
increase since 1982. Smith, Battling a Receding Tort Frontier: Constitutional At-
tacks on Medical Malpractice Laws, 38 OKLA. L. REV. 195, 196 n.2 (1985Xciting
A.M.A., SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON PROF. LIAB. & INS. PROF. LIA. IN THE '80's, REP.
No. 1 at 10 (Oct. 1984)).
1 From 1960 through 1970, surgeons' insurance rates soared 942.2%. Non-
surgeons' rates increased 540.8% and hospital rates increased 262.7%. Note, Ohio's
Attempts to Halt the Medical Malpractice Crisis: Effective or Meaningless?, 9 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 361 (1984) [hereinafter Note] (citing U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH EDUCA-
TION AND WELFARE, MED. MALPRACTICE REP. OF THE SECRETARY'S COMM'N ON MED.
MALPRACTICE 13 (1973)).
" Hilliard, Alternative Recovery Methods: Structured Settlements & Periodic
Payments of Judgments, 34 FED'N INS. CouNs. Q. 237 (1984) [hereinafter Hilliard].
See also Kabel, Medical Malpractice Damage Awards: The Need for a Dual Ap-
proach, 11 FoaDHAm URB. L.J. 973 (1982-83) [hereinafter Kabel].
5 In the early 1970's, Senator Abraham Ribicoff headed a subcommittee organiz-
ed to investigate the increase in medical malpractice litigation. They determined
that there is a general breakdown in the patient's trust and respect of the doctor.
People perceive physicians as wealthy, golf-playing elitests. Our mobile society
prevents the growth of community feelings and the growth of rapport with the fami-
ly doctor. Doctors overbook and maintain a casual attitude, suggesting lack of em-
pathy. Ribicoff, Medical Malpractice: The Patient vs. the Physician, 6 TRIAL 10
(Feb./March 1970).
' Kabel, supra note 4, at 977.
' Roth, The Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Its Causes, the Effects, and
Proposed Solutions, 44 INS. COUNS. J. 469, 472 (1977) [hereinafter Roth].
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Some critics claim the crisis was due to the insurance industry's desire
to obtain excess profits in an attempt to recover from their stock market
losses.' The physicians blame the crisis on the legal profession for becoming
ever more litigious.9
Regardless of the origin of the crisis, "the perceptions of a panicked
public as well as ferocious lobbying by the medical profession and insurance
industry generated intense pressure on state legislatures to enact remedial
legislation."10 The alteration of the common law rules surrounding medical
malpractice litigation is at the heart of such legislation. The major altera-
tion is a change from the common law lump sum award rule to the alter-
nate recovery method of a periodic payment award.
Periodic payment awards are judgments payable in installments rather
than as one lump sum. " If multi-million dollar judgments can be paid over
time, insurance companies can reduce cash reserves thereby reducing
malpractice insurance premiums, and ultimately, this will result in lower
health care costs for the general public. 2
Ohio has felt the panic surrounding the medical malpractice crisis.
13
In response, the Ohio Legislature passed Amended Substitute House Bill
327 in 1987, creating a mandatory periodic payment scheme for medical
malpractice judgments.
The focus of this article is the use of periodic payment plans generally
as a remedy to the medical malpractice crisis. A complete understanding
of the periodic payment judgment, however, is impossible without an ex-
ploration of the general common law treatment of personal injury and
medical malpractice awards. Once the historical background is established,
this article will examine Ohio's new statute in light of the Model Periodic
Payment of Judgments Act and the law existing in other jurisdictions. This
article will also analyze the advantages of the periodic payment and its
viability as a solution for the medical malpractice crisis.
8 Learner, Restrictive Medical Malpractice Compensation Schemes: A Constitu-
tional "Quid Pro Quo" Analysis to Safeguard Individual Liberties, 18 HARv. J. ON
LEGIS. 143, 144-45 (1980) [hereinafter Learner]. See also Corboy, Structured Injustice:
Compulsory Periodic Payment of Judgments, 66 A.B.A.J. 1524 (1980) [hereinafter
Corboy].
9 See Blaut, supra note 1, at 115.
10 Learner, supra note 8, at 144.
11 See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
'3 See infra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
1988-89]
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Common Law History of Personal Injury
Awards - The Lump Sum Award
The main purpose of the tort law surrounding personal injury awards14
is to restore the injured party to his prior economic position. 5 More
specifically, in a medical malpractice action, the damage award must meet
two criteria: (1) the award must adequately compensate the victim for his
losses, 6 and (2) the award should deter potential tortfeasors from engag-
ing in similarly negligent actions. 7
Historically, the victim of a tort was compensated by a singular award
of money, a doctrine known as the lump sum award. Adopted from English
common law, the doctrine requires that "all damages for an injury must
be recovered in a single action."' 8 That is, the trier-of-fact determines all
past and future damages and returns a judgment for a single sum. 9 This
lump sum award doctrine, applicable to both personal injury and medical
malpractice awards, was paralleled in the United States in Frankel v.
'" "Personal injury ... denotes an injury to the physical body of a person, in-
cluding pain and suffering from such injury, injury to a person's health, or to his
reputation, as contradistinguished from injury to his property." Hindert, Periodic
Payments of Personal Injury Damages, 31 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 3, 3 n.1
(1980-8lXquoting Koon v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 90 Ga. App. 877, 878, 84 S.E.2d
703, 704 (1954)) [hereinafter Payments].
1" See Grossman & Roman, Model Periodic Payment of Judgments Act - An
Economic Analysis, 18 TRIAL 62 (May 1982) [hereinafter Analysis]. "One injured
by the tort of another is entitled to recover damages from the other for all harm,
past, present and prospective, legally caused by the tort." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §910 (1979).
16 There are three criteria for the determination of the appropriate level of com-
pensation for a tort claimant: (1) the compensation method must minimize the cost
of the specified standard of living; (2) the post-judgment risk faced by the claimant
must be compared with the risks the claimant may have faced had he not been
injured; and (3) if the risk level is changed as a result of the injury, the claimant
should receive increased compensation if he faces increased risk, and decreased
compensation if he faces decreased risk. Rea, Lump Sum versus Periodic Damage
Awards, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 133 (1981) [hereinafter Real.
" Kabel, supra note 4, at 980.
18 Fetter v. Beale, 91 Eng. Rep. 11 (1699), affd, Eng. Rep. 112 (1702).
19 OHIO LEGAL CENTER INSTITUTE, REFERENCE MANUAL FOR CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION - OmIo TORT REFORM 7.0 (1987)[hereinafter REFERENCE MANUAL]. See
also Henderson, Periodic Payments of Bodily Injury Awards, 66 A.B.A.J. 734 (1980)
[hereinafter Henderson].
The fact trier must also reduce the future damages to present value. The pre-
sent value of an award is the amount which, if currently invested at the present
long term interest rates, will yield the total value of the award in the future. Com-
ment, Period Payment Plans: Are Annuities Adequately Protecting the Personal In-
jury Plaintiff from Inflation, Providing Accurate Attorney's Fees and Promoting
the Compensatory Goal of Our Tort Law System?, 12 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 271, 276
(1985)[hereinafter Comment]. See also Hilliard, supra note 4, at 259 n.97.
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United States,20 when the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held in part that
no judgment can be "payable in installments. 21
Despite the fact that lump sum awards have existed since the seven-
teenth century, there persists an inherent danger of inaccuracy in lump
sum jury verdicts. 22 The inaccuracy stems from the trier-of-fact's inability
to accurately determine at the time of judgment the victim's true life span,
predict changes in his or her earning power and forecast the amount of
future expenses likely to be incurred. 23 "[I]t will never be known what the
victim would have been like had he or she not been injured... [The] mere
passage of time, however, will reveal what the victim will be like. '24 It
is this inherent inaccuracy coupled with the increasing size of lump sum
awards which has skyrocketed the cost of medical malpractice insurance
and resulted in the medical malpractice crisis.
25
B. The History of the Periodic Payment Award
Conceding that the main goal of our tort system is accurate and ade-
quate compensation of the victim, legislatures have instituted periodic pay-
ment awards in an attempt to achieve this goal. A periodic payment award
is a judgment that is payable in installments rather than as one lump
sum. 26 The legislators assert that periodic payment plans are more accurate
because they can be adapted to the unique needs of each claimant. 27 Since
"[diamages and losses occur periodically, ... a structured settlement
assists the claimant economically and psychologically by providing a
natural, periodic-payment scheme. ' 28 Besides being made whole again, the
claimant can enjoy tax advantages and can be relieved of investment
20 321 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1970), affd, 466 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972). Ac-
cord Kaczkineski v. Bolobasz, 491 Pa. 561, 421 A.2d 1027 (1980).
21321 F.Supp. at 1340. In Frankel, the United States refused to allow a judicially
created trust as a settlement tool in a negligence action filed under the Federal
Tort Claims Act.
22 Comm. on Uniform State Laws, Commission Rep.: Model Periodic Payment
of Judgments Act, 39 REC. OF THE A. OF THE B. OF N.Y. 11, 24 (Jan./Feb. 1984)
[hereinafter Comm. Rep.].
23 Id
24 MODEL ACT, supra note 2, §11 commentary, at 37.
25 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
2
' Elligett, The Periodic Payment of Judgments, 46 INS. CouNs. J. 130, 131 (1979)
[hereinafter Elligett].
27 In most literature, the term structured settlement has become a generic label
for alternate recovery settlements before judgment although the Structured Set-
tlements Co. of Los Angeles, California has claimed the term as a proprietary ser-
vice mark. Comment, Structured Settlements: Customized Compensation for Per-
sonal Injury Plaintiffs, 13 STETSON L. REV. 309 (1984) [hereinafter Customized
Compensation].
The term periodic payment plan as used in this article refers exclusively to
a judicially approved plan to pay a court's judgment over time.
28 Carestia, Structured Settlements in Practice, 46 MONT. L. REV. 25, 36 (1985)
[hereinafter Carestia].
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decisions,29 and the defendant benefits because periodic payment plans are
ultimately cheaper to finance than lump sum awards.3 0
Although only recently accepted as a viable alternative to a lump sum
award, periodic payment schemes have been a part of judicial history for
years, especially in cases where the defendant is of limited financial
means.3 1 The first use of a periodically paid verdict in a personal injury
case in the United States 32 was in M & P Stores, Inc. v. Taylor.3 The
Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld a jury verdict that was paid out at $150
per month for twenty years. The court noted:
The verdict should not have been rendered in this form; and
should not have been received in this form; however, it was re-
ceived and neither party objected to it and neither party now con-
tends that the verdict was void, and under those circumstances,
this court will not of its own volition, invalidate it.3
In response to the view "that the incorporation of periodic payment
plans in judgments involves such a substantial departure from common
law practices that it requires statutory authorization," 5 several state
legislatures began to enact periodic payment legislation in the area of
medical malpractice awards.3 6 Despite the initial judicial reluctance and
continued distaste by the plaintiff's bar, a broader segment of the personal
injury bar is realizing the ability of the periodic payment plan to meet the
claimant's needs at a more efficient cost to society.3
C. Periodic Payment Plans Generally
In spite of the uncertain start of the early periodic payment plan legisla-
tion, more and more states began enacting similar legislation. Certain pro-
visions appeared consistently in these early statutes.3 8 For ex-
29 See infra notes 156-80 and accompanying text. Comment, supra note 19, at
285. Critics fear a change in recovery methods. Some critics assert that periodic
payments actually threaten a claimant's right to recovery because they are such
a drastic departure from tort common law. Id. at 281. Additionally, critics fear
lack of finality in the judicial system because the claimant's award is subject to
continuous review. Id. However, most periodic payment plans do not allow for such
continuous review.
30 See infra notes 181-87 and accompanying text.
31 Plant, Periodic Payment of Damages for Personal Injury, 44 LA. L. REV. 1327
(1984) [hereinafter Plant].
32 Hilliard, supra note 4, at 262.
33 326 P.2d 804 (Okla. 1958).
Id at 808-09.
35 Plant, supra note 31, at 1333.
31 See infra notes 106-52 and accompanying text. In 1975, various states began
enacting statutes to allow periodic payment of medical malpractice awards. Hilliard,
supra note 4, at 262.
11 Plant, supra note 31, at 1328.
38 See generally REFERENCE MANuAL, supra note 19, at 7.02. See also supra notes
106-52 and accompanying text.
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ample, past damages (past medical bills and lost wages) are typically paid
in a lump sum at judgment due to the claimant's need to pay expenses
already incurred. 9 Only non-accrued future damages will be covered by
periodic payment plans. Such damages will normally include "(1) medical
expenses, costs of care or custody, and other outlays related to the claim-
ant's physical and mental condition; (2) economic losses such as wages or
other income reduced or precluded by the injury; and (3) future non-
economic losses including pain and suffering, loss of consortium, and loss
of normal bodily functions."4 Normally, an expert witness is used to
establish the appropriate dollar amounts needed to fund a payment plan
to compensate the victim in an amount equal to the verdict.
41
The legislators commonly left the specific terms of the plan up to the
discretion of the court. Some of the optional provisions available to the
court include: monthly payments to the claimant for life or a term certain,
lump sum payments at intervals, medical funds for future medical ex-
penses, rehabilitation funds, college funds for the victim's children,
custodial funds for the victim's future care, and a minimum number of
payments ordered to guarantee monetary protection of the heirs should
the plaintiff die prematurely.
4
The legislators also left the funding of the plan up to the discretion
of the court. The plan can be financed personally by the defendant or by
his liability insurer. 43 Such plans are rare due to their lack of security for
the claimant. 44 To decrease the security risk, the defendant or his insurer
can make a qualified assignment of the obligation to pay. A qualified
assignment is an assignment to an insurance company of the liability to
pay personal injury damages. 45
Alternatively, the court can permit the defendant or his insurer to
render payment through a trust. In such a situation, the claimant essen-
tially releases the defendant from liability for the tort judgment and
39 See Hilliard, supra note 4, at 239-40.
10 Plant, supra note 31, at 1329.
4' Levin, Effective Opening Statements, ch. 10, reprinted in THE FIRST ANNUAL
PEmODIC PAYMENT JUDGMENTS 202 (Law J. Seminar Press ed. 1987)hereinaller FIRST
ANNUAL]. See generally Welcher, Structured Settlement Expert as Defense Economist,
25 FOR THE DEF. 27 (June 1983).
41 Crane, How to Use and Benefit from Structural Settlements in Personal In-
jury Suits, 59 J. TAX'N 330 (1983).
"In such a plan, the defendant simply makes an unsecured promise to the claim-
ant to pay future installments. The defendant retains control of the assets used
to fund the payments. FIRST ANNUAL, supra note 41, at 180.
"Id at 181. Five types of security are permissible: (1) a bond executed by a
qualified insurer; (2) an annuity contract executed by a qualified insurer; (3)
evidence of liability insurance with a qualified insurer; (4) an agreement made
by a qualified insurer to guarantee the payment; or (5) any other satisfactory form
of security.
' See infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
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maintains rights only as a trust beneficiary. The defendant retains a rever-
sionary interest in the money used to fund the trust if the plaintiff dies
before the funds are exhausted.
46
A trust, however, may not be the ideal choice in every situation. For
instance, if the trust is held by a bank, it may require additional deposits
or otherwise be unwilling to guarantee a long-term fixed rate of return.
4 7
A better idea would be for the court to allow funding of the periodic pay-
ment plan with an annuity.48 Funded by a single premium, an annuity
is a series of equal payments over time at a constant interest rate.49 In
such an arrangement, while the claimant releases the defendant from tort
liability, the defendant maintains his duty to make the payments under
the periodic payment judgment. To fulfill the duty, the defendant may pur-
chase an annuity which pays benefits to the claimant .5 An annuity is the
most widely used form of funding, since it has the advantage of being
funded with a single payment by the defendant.5 1 Annuities also cost the
defendant twenty to thirty percent less than a comparable trust.
5 2
III. EXISTING LEGISLATION
A. The Model Periodic Payment of Judgments Act 51
The general provisions and funding of the plans outlined above were
based on early state periodic payment statutes. This legislation was often
vague and created interpretation, application and administration pro-
blems.' In an effort to unify the statutes, the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Law met in 1977 to develop model legisla-
tion abolishing lump sum judgments. 5 After eights drafts, the Model
4 See REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 19, at 7.16.
4" Elligett, supra note 26, at 144.
4 The types of annuities available include the immediate or deferred annuity,
the life insurance annuity, the period certain annuity, the installment refund an-
nuity, the increasing payment annuity and the survivorship annuity as defined
in FiRsT ANNUAL, supra note 43, at 183-85.
" Comment, supra note 19, at 275.
50 See REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 19, at 7.13.
51 See generally Halpern, A Plaintiffs Alternative to Structured Settlements,
23 TRIAL 83, 84-89 (1987Xrecommending the use of a single-premium whole life
insurance policy to fund the periodic payout) [hereinafter Halpern]. However, if
the claimant is to retain tax advantages, he must not have contractual rights in
the annuity. See infra notes 156-64 and accompanying text.
52 Elligett, supra note 26, at 144.
53 14 U.L.A. 2 (1980 & Supp. 1988).
5 See MODEL ACT, supra note 2, Prefatory Note, at 1.
55 The committee was chaired by Roger C. Henderson, distinguished legal
scholar and then Dean of Arizona State University College of Law. See Hender-
son, supra note 19, at 734.
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Periodic Payment of Judgments Act [hereinafter Model Act] was passed
on August 1, 1980.56 The Model Act was meant as a guide for states to
use to tailor their own legislation 7 and was geared to the payment of per-
sonal injury, products liability and medical malpractice actions.5 8 This sec-
tion will examine how a malpractice claim is pursued under the provisions
of the Model Act.
Initiating a medical malpractice claim under the Model Act is not man-
datory. The parties to a malpractice action may try the case under the
Model Act by mutual consent. Absent mutual consent, a periodic payment
judgment will issue only where the claimant's future damages exceed
$100,000. 5 ' Thus, if the claimant moves to have his claim tried under the
Model Act, he must show he has a good faith claim for future damages
which exceed $100,000.60 If the defendant so moves, he must show that
the claimant claims future damages of more than $100,000 and that he
can provide the specified security." However, objections to trying the case
under the Model Act may be raised by either party on the ground that
"the purposes of the Act would not be served."6' 2
Assuming no objections are raised, the claim is tried under the Model
Act and if the defendant is found liable, the Model Act provides that the
jury must include in its verdict specific findings fixing the amount of past
and future damages for medical costs, economic loss, and non-economic
loss"3 without regard to future inflation." All past damages are then paid
in a lump sum. If the claimant requests periodic payments, the court will
so order regardless of the amount of the future damages.6 5 Otherwise, if
the jury's verdict includes at least $100,000 of future damages the court
56 The Act was not passed as a uniform law because the committee felt the
changes were experimental. See P. Carroll, Remarks in the Proceedings in Com-
mittee of the Whole on the Model Periodic Payment of Judgments Act of the Na-
tional Conference of Commissions on Uniform State Laws 1 (July 28, 1980)
[hereinafter Committee Proceedings] (available in Cleveland-Marshall Law School
Library) (microfiche).
57 See MODEL ACT, supra note 2, Prefatory Note, at 2. Such a solution was
preferable to a federal law with the resultant administration problems. Id at 4.
However, no state has yet adopted the act in full. Of the states with periodic pay-
ment of medical malpractice judgments statutes, only Illinois has patterned its
statute after the Model Act. 1985 Ill. Legis. Serv. §§ 2-1701 to 1719 (West).
58 See MODEL ACT, supra note 2, Prefatory Note, at 2. Although not specifically
dealing with medical malpractice, the commissioner's goal was to allow people with
medical claims to receive their actual economic losses. Mr. Downs, Committee Pro-
ceedings 7 (July 28, 1980).
:9 MODEL ACT, supra note 2, § 3, at 8.
60 Id
61 Id
62 Id
63 MODEL ACT, supra note 2, §§ 2, 4(a), at 6, 12.
"Id § 5, at 15.
65 Id § 6(2), at 17.
1988-89]
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
will make certain adjustments to the amount 6 and if the future damages
after adjustment exceed $50,000, the court shall enter judgment for future
damages paid in periodic installments.
6 7
When a periodic payment judgment is entered, the defendant must post
judicially approved security for the payments within thirty days, and main-
tain that security for the life of the award. 8 The defendant has an incen-
tive to post security since the periodic payment plan will be cheaper for
him to fund than a lump sum award. If the requisite security is not posted
or maintained, the court will enter a lump sum judgment.6 9 If the failure
to comply is capricious or in bad faith, the lump sum judgment is entered
without discounting the payment to present value.7 0
Upon death of the claimant, the Model Act provides that the award
payments for medical and other health care costs and non-economic loss
terminate. Other future installments will be paid in conformity with the
judgment to the surviving beneficiaries. 71
B. Ohio's Statute: O.R.C. § 2323.57
1. History of Ohio's Statute
When Ohio first addressed the medical malpractice crisis, the
legislature did not have the benefit of the Model Act's guidance. "On July
1, 1975, before the enactment of the Model Act, the Ohio State Medical
Association informed Ohio's General Assembly that according to its survey,
'within the next several days, the number of physicians unable to continue
medical practice in Ohio because of lack of adequate malpractice coverage
will reach crisis proportions'." 7" In an attempt to remedy the crisis, the
Ohio Legislature passed Amended Substitute House Bill 682, which was
scheduled to take effect July 28, 1975.7 1 The aim of this original medical
malpractice legislation was to guarantee "the availability of medical
malpractice insurance. ' 74 The legislation in effect changed the statute of
66 The amount of attorney's fees are deducted from the future damage award.
MODEL ACT, supra note 2, § 6(3Xi), at 17. The amount of payments to subrogees
entitled to reimbursement (e.g., workers' compensation) are deducted from the
future damage award. Id § 6(3Xii), at 18.
67 Id § 6(3Xiv), at 18.
6" Id § 9(a), (b), at 29. Satisfactory security includes the five types listed supra
note 44.
69 MODEL ACT, supra note 2, § 9(b), at 29.
71 Id § 9(c), at 29.
71 Id § 11, at 35. Special provisions also exist for wrongful death beneficiaries. Id
72 Note, supra note 3, at 363.73 Amended Substitute House Bill 682 was adopted by the Legislature July 24,
1975. It was approved by the governor and became effective July 28, 1975. Id (citing
the 111th Ohio General Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess., 136 Omio HousE J. 687 (1975)).
74 Id (citing Senate to Focus Its Attention Next Week on Medical Malpractice
Bill, Gongwers News Serv., Inc., Ohio Report, July 11, 1975, at 2).
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limitations, established compulsory non-binding arbitration, and set a
$200,000 damage recovery limit with regard to medical malpractice ac-
tions.75
Lacking the guidance of the Model Act, the 1975 statute failed to pro-
vide for periodic payments. The only provision of the early medical malprac-
tice statute which was related to the goal of a periodic payment award was
the $200,000 cap on damages."' This restriction on recovery was meant
to reduce the cost of medical malpractice insurance by reducing the amount
of the award available to claimants.7 However, the statutory change was
unsuccessful because: (1) the limits were rarely imposed by the arbitra-
tion panels or the courts,7 and (2) the statute failed to alleviate the basic
causes of medical malpractice litigation."
When Ohio's legislators realized that the early statute was essential-
ly ineffective in lowering medical malpractice insurance rates, a new
statutory scheme was implemented.8 0 Amended Substitute House Bill 327
[hereinafter H.B. 3271 changed the statute of limitations, eliminated man-
datory arbitration, required authentication of claims and directly addressed
the medical malpractice crisis by creating a mandatory periodic payment
plan for judgments with future damages in excess of $200,000 in medical
malpractice actions. 1 In developing the new statutory scheme for periodic
payments, Ohio's legislature could have patterned the statute after any
of the earlier state statutes or the Model Act. Instead, the legislature de-
cided to develop a statute considerably more detailed in its coverage and
its guidelines for application than any earlier statute.82
2. Specific Provisions of Ohio's Statute
To litigate under these detailed provisions, the claimant must have
made a medical, dental, optometric or chiropractic claim with future
damages exceeding $200,000 whereupon either party may move the court
to try the case under the statute.83 In cases tried under the statute, the
jury must first return a general verdict. When the verdict is in favor of
the plaintiff, the jury must then answer interrogatories specifying past
71 Id. at 363-64.
76 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.43 (Baldwin 1981).
" Note, supra note 3, at 383.
78 Id See supra notes 5, 6 and accompanying text.
Note, supra note 3, at 387.
Amended Substitute House Bill 327, effective Oct. 20, 1987 [hereinafter H.B.
327], 1987 Ohio Legis. Serv. 327 (Baldwin).81 Each of these sections of the House Bill was published in Omo REV. CODE
ANN. in 1988.
82 REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 19, at 7.02. See comparison with other state
laws infra notes 106-52 and accompanying text.
83 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.57(AX3), (BX1) (Baldwin 1988).
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damages84 and future damages 85 including non-economic loss,86 economic
loss,8" compensatory economic loss,88 medical economic losses,8 9 and
miscellaneous economic loss.9 0 The jury should also include in their answers
to interrogatories: (1) the length of time over which the future damages
will continue; (2) the discount rate used to determine the present value
of the award; and (3) the growth ratio for the earning power of the dollar
that should be used.9 1
Should the interrogatories reveal future damages greater than
$200,000, either party may, before the judgment entry, move for an order
of the court that the future damages in excess of $200,000 be paid in
periodic payments.92 Upon such a request the court shall order that the
first $200,000 in future damages be paid in a lump sum.93 Any future
damages greater than $200,000 shall be used to fund a series of periodic
payments in compliance with H.B. 327.11 If neither party timely requests
periodic payments, or the future damges are less than $200,000, a lump
sum award for the entire verdict will be made.
95
If either party requests periodic payment, within 20 days after the mo-
tion the claimant shall submit a plan for periodic payment. 6 The defend-
ant can file jointly with the plaintiff, or he may submit his own plan.9 7
Alternatively, the defendant can examine the plaintiffs plan and then
within ten days submit his comments to court. The plaintiff may exercise
8 § 2323.57(AX1X5). Past damages are those damages accrued by the time the
determination of liability is rendered in a medical malpractice claim.
§ 2323.57(AX6).
85 § 2323.57(BX1Xb). Future damages are those damages that will occur after
the determination of liability is rendered in a medical malpractice claim.
§ 2323.57(AX2).
8r § 2323.57(BX1)(bXi). Non-economic loss means non-pecuniary harm resulting
from an injury, death, or loss to person or property such as pain and suffering,
loss of consortium and any other intangible loss. § 2323.57(AX4).
81 § 2323.57 (BX1XbXii). Economic loss is any of a variety of pecuniary harm.
§ 2323.57 (AX1).
88 § 2323.57(BX1)(bXiii). Compensatory economic loss means all wages, salaries,
or other compensation lost as a result of an injury, death, or loss to person or pro-
perty. § 2323.57(AX1Xa).
89 § 2323.57(BX1XbXiv). Medical economic loss means all payments for medical
care or treatment as a result of an injury, death or loss to persons or property.
§ 2323.57(AX1)(b).
90 § 2323.57(BX1)(bXv). Miscellaneous economic loss means any other expendi-
tures incurred as a result of an injury, death, or loss to person or property other
than attorney's fees. § 2323.57(AX1Xc).
91 REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 19, at 7.06.
92 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.57(C).
93 § 2323.57(CX1). No claimant shall receive less than $200,000 plus attorney's
fees and costs. § 2323.57(EX2).
94 § 2323.57(CX2).
95 § 2323.57(DX2).
" § 2323.57(DX1Xa).
97 § 2323.57(DX1)(b).
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a similar option should the defendant file a plan. 8 After all the plans are
submitted, the court will accept, reject or alter the plans.9
Consistent with the majority of jurisdictions, Ohio provides that if the
complainant dies before receiving the entire periodic award, payments of
the part determined to be future medical care or non-economic damages
will cease. 100 The balance of the future damages (essentially lost wages)
shall be paid as scheduled to the heirs of the plaintiff as entered in the
payment plan or as determined by the court.'0 1
As to funding, the statute is consistent with the flexible early legisla-
tion of other jurisdictions and indirectly suggests 10 2 that the periodic pay-
ment plan be funded by an annuity'03 or trust.' 4 The only restriction is
that if an annuity is used, the annuity must be purchased from an approved
insurance company."0 5
C. Periodic Payment Statutes in Other Jurisdictions
As previously mentioned, the Ohio legislature decided not to pattern
its periodic payment of medical malpractice judgment statute after any
other jurisdiction. The medical malpractice crisis had prompted sixteen
states'06 in the mid-1970's to adopt new rules and procedures to deal with
medical malpractice claims, including provisions for periodic payment of
98 § 2323.57(DX1Xc).
99 The court's discretion extends only to the terms of the plan, not to whether
a periodic payment plan shall issue at all. § 2323.57(DX1Xd).
100 § 2323.57(FX1).
101 § 2323.57(FX2).
I" "After a periodic payments plan is approved, the future damages that are
to be received in periodic payments shall be paid in accordance with the plan, in-
cluding, if applicable, payment over to a trust or annuity provided for in the plan."
§ 2323.57(DX1Xe).
103 See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
'04 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
105 The A.M. Best Company must have rated the Ohio based insurance com-
pany A or better and XII or higher as to financial size and strength. Omo REV.
CODE ANN. § 2323.57(EX1Xa) (Baldwin 1988). The A.M. Best Company is the authori-
ty in the analysis of finance and management of life insurance companies. Carestia,
supra note 28, at 41-42. Over 1,500 life insurance companies are rated annually
by classification from A+ (excellent) to C (fair) in management. The ratings in-
dicate the ability of a company to pay policy holder obligations over the long term.
Id at 42. The companies are also rated according to financial size based upon policy
holder's surplus. The ratings range from Class I ($250,000 or less) to Class XV
($1,000,000 or more). Id at 42.
101 The sixteen states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Delaware,
Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, North Dakota, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, Oregon, South Carolina and Wisconsin. Hindert, Dehner & Hindert,
Structured Settlements and Periodic Payment Judgments ch. 10 (1986) reprinted
in FIRsT ANNuAL 21, 24 [hereinafter Hindert, Structured Settlements].
Of these state statutes, two have been repealed: (1) North Dakota, N.D. CENT.
CODE § 2640, 1-16 (1977 Supp.), repealed by S.L. 1983, ch. 332, § 26 and (2) Oregon,
OR. REV. STAT. § 752.070 (1977), repealed by 1987 C. 774 § 154. New Hampshire's
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judgments. Many other states added such statutes in the late 1980's."'°
A comparison of the major provisions of Ohio's statute to these other
statutes will show the similarities and differences in both approach and
reach of the various jurisdictions.
1. Threshold Amount
The first major common provision is the threshold amount of future
damages needed for the periodic payment statutes to apply. The majority
of state statutes contain a provision that a periodic payment judgment can-
not be ordered unless a threshold amount of future damages is reached.
The threshold amount for the claimant's future damages can arise in one
of three ways: (1) meeting the threshold may allow the court to order a
periodic payment judgment;1 8 (2) meeting the threshold amount may re-
quire the court to order a periodic payment judgment;0 9 and (3) meeting
the threshold amount combined with some other factor may influence the
court to enter a periodic payment judgment."0
The amount of the threshold varies from state to state, with amounts
ranging from $25,000"' to $250,0001" in future damages. The Model Act
takes an intermediate position designating a threshold amount of $100,000
in future damages." 3 Generally, some minimum threshold amount is ad-
vantageous since the cost of administering periodic payments is prohibitive
for small awards." 4 Despite this advantage however, several state statutes
statute was held unconstitutional: Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825
(1980).
This article is limited to states with periodic payment of medical malpractice
judgment statutes only as of December 1987. Therefore, states with periodic pay-
ment plan statutes applicable to all personal injury claims or municipal claims
are not discussed. These states are: Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Loui-
siana, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, South Dakota and
Washington. FIRST ANNUAL, supra note 41, at 261-62.
10. Maine added a statute in 1985, Missouri and Utah added a statute in 1986,
and Ohio added a statute in 1987.
108 Elligett, supra note 26, at 137. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-486 (1977).
'0 Elligett, supra note 26, at 137. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3407(cX3X1986);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-59-180 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
11 Normally the "other factor" is a request made by either party to: (1) try
the case under the statute if the damages sought exceed the threshold amount;
or (2) render a periodic payment judgment if the verdict exceeds the threshold
amount. See MODEL ACT, supra note 2, § 3, at 8; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2619(DX1985);
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 667.7(aXWest 1987); 1985 Ill. Legis. Serv. 84-7 § 2-1705
(b)(West); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2951(2X1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.220
(2XVernon 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-9.5(2X1987); §§ 2323.57(BX1) and (C)
of 1987 Ohio Legis. Serv. 327 (Baldwin).
... WIS. STAT. ANN. § 655.015 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987).
.. 1985 Ill. Legis. Serv. 84-7 § 2-1705(b)(West); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§ 2951(2X1987).
"3 MODEL ACT, supra note 2, §§ 3(a), 6(3Xiv), at 8, 18.
I" See Elligett, supra note 26, at 136.
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have no designated minimum threshold amount. 115 The rationale offered
for such statutes is that these states were unable to calculate the social
costs of periodic payment plans. Thus, the amount of future damages which
would be awarded in a periodic payment plan is left to the court's discre-
tion."6
In Ohio, the claimant must have a good faith claim of $200,000 in future
damages and an election must be made by either party to try the case under
the provisions of the statute. 17 Additionally, a verdict of $200,000 in future
damages plus a second election by either party is necessary to enter judg-
ment by periodic payment. 18 The rational behind this higher than average
threshold amount was to impart the benefits 9 of the periodic payment
judgment to the most needy claimant, the seriously injured victim.
2. Court's Discretion
Once the threshold amount is met, the statutes contain provisions direc-
ting the amount of discretion the judge possesses to order a periodic pay-
ment plan. The majority of states have mandatory provisions for the use
of periodic payment judgments above the threshold amount with120 or at
the request of either party. 2'
A small number of state periodic payment statutes entrust the trial
judge with the discretion to decide whether or not to use a periodic pay-
ment plan.122 Unfortunately, none of these discretionary statutes require
the judge to use a payment plan or set forth guidelines on how to exercise
his or her discretion. 23 Another problem with discretionary statutes is that
a trial judge may initially be reluctant to fashion a periodic payment plan
because of his or her unfamiliarity with the mechanics of such plans. 1 4
Despite these problems, critics argue that periodic payment judg-
ments should always be optional by the parties and never be man-
"' These states are Delaware, Maryland and New Mexico. Hindert, Structured
Settlements, supra note 106, at 29.
116 Elligett, supra note 26, at 137.
17 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
18 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
"9 See infra notes 156-80 and accompanying text.
120 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3407(cX3X1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 655.015 (West 1980
& Supp. 1987).
121 MODEL ACT, supra note 2, § 6(3Xiv), at 18; CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 667.7 (West
1987); 1985 Ill. Legis. Serv. 84-7 § 2-1708(8)(West); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§ 2951(2X1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.220(2XVernon 1987); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-14-9.5(2X1987); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.57(CXBaldwin 1988).
122 ALA. CODE § 6-5-486 (1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2619(DX1985); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 18, § 6864(aX1986); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-109(cX1X1984).
123 Hindert, Structured Settlements, supra note 106, at 37.
124 Id.
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datory by the court. "' Proponents of mandatory. provisions, however, assert
that if the lump sum and periodic payment plan awards are allowed to
co-exist, the parties may be unable to choose the best form of payment for
the claimant's award. 126 In contrast to other state statutes, Ohio's statute
provides for both a mandatory trial of the case under the periodic payment
provisions at the request of either party127 and a mandatory entry of a
periodic payment judgment at the request of either party. " The statute
is a clear signal to Ohio's judiciary that the legislature is serious about
the use of periodic payment judgments.
3. Damages Allowed in Periodic Payment Awards
The next major statutory provisions, once the judge has determined
that a periodic payment plan is to be ordered, are those concerning which
future damages can be paid periodically. State statutes differ as to how
much and what kind of damages are to be included in a periodic payment
plan. The majority of states require the court to enter a lump sum judg-
ment for at least part of the damage award. In such states, only future
damages in excess of the threshold amount may be ordered to be paid
periodically. Past damages up to the time of the judgment and future
damages up to the threshold amount must be paid by lump sum. The ma-
jority of states allow all future expenses to be paid periodically by the
defendant, his insurer12 9 or the state compensation fund.13 A few states
limit the periodic payment to future medical expenses, 3 ' or to future
economic losses.13 2
Like the majority of states, Ohio allows all future damages in excess
of the threshold amount to be paid in periodic payments. Ohio does not
limit future damages paid by the plan to medical expenses or economic
losses because to do so would defeat the purpose behind the periodic pay-
ment plan which is to pay all the damages as the losses are incurred.
125 See generally Vertlieb, Mandatory Structured Settlements and the Subtle
Assault on the Tort System, 4 Am. J. TRiAL ADvoc. 657 (1981) [hereinafter Vertlieb].
126 Rea, supra note 16, at 145-46.
127 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.57(BX1) (Baldwin 1988).
128 § 2323.57(C).
129 MODEL ACT, supra note 2, § 2, at 6; ALA. CODE § 6-5-486(1), (2X1977); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 34-2619(DX1985); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 667.7(bX)(West 1987); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6864(aX1X1986); 1985 Ill. Legis. Serv. 84-7 § 2-1709(bXWest);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2951(2X1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.220 (Vernon
1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-9.5(2), (3X1987); Oino REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.57(EX1)
(Baldwin 1988).
18o IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2-2.4 (1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-59-180.
131 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-7(EX1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 655.015 (West 1980
& Supp. 1987)
132 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3407(cX3X1986); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 11-109(cX1984).
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4. Security for the Claimant
Even though the court orders a periodic payment judgment for the
damages designated by the statute, the claimant may be concerned about
the security of his right to payment. Therefore, a majority of the state
statutes contain security provisions to protect the claimant from the risk
of the defendant's non-compliance with the periodic payment judgment. 33
Jurisdictions which provide that the court has discretion to require the
posting of adequate security if the defendant is inadequately insured do
not protect the claimant 13 4 if the court fails to clearly define "inadequate-
ly insured" and "adequate security." Statutes which provide that the court
must require posting of adequate security offer greater protection to the
claimant. 135
The statutory provisions supplying the greatest protection for the claim-
ant and the clearest administrative guidelines for the court are those
statutes which incorporate Section 8 of the Model Act.136 This section pro-
vides that security must be posted in one of five forms: (1) a bond executed
by a qualified insurer; (2) an annuity contract executed by a qualified in-
surer; (3) evidence of applicable and collectible liability insurance with one
or more qualified insurers; (4) an agreement by one or more qualified in-
surers to guarantee payment of the judgment; or (5) any other satisfac-
tory form of security.137
Unlike the Model Act, Ohio's statute provides protection to the claim-
ant without explicitly directing the court as to the type of security required.
In Ohio, to decree a periodic payment judgment, the court must find there
is adequate security'38 to ensure the plaintiff will receive all payments
under the plan. 3 9 To accomplish this goal, the statute suggests the use
of an annuity.140
133The only state which has no provision at all is Delaware. See generally DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6864 (1986).
134 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2619(DX1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.220(3XVernon
1987).
135 ALA. CODE § 6-5-486(4X1977); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 667.7(aXWest 1987);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2951(2X1987).
"' The range of options allows the security of payment to be structured in such
a way as to maintain favorable income tax treatment. See infra notes 156-64 and
accompanying text.
137 MODEL ACT, supra note 2, § 8, at 26; 1985 1ll. Legis. Serv. 84-7 § 2-1710 (West);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-9.5 (3) (1987). The security must be in an amount equal
to the sum of present value of future and past damages. MODEL ACT, supra note
2, § 9 commentary, at 31.
18 Adequate security means a sufficient, but not absolutely air-tight, guarantee
of future payments. Reference Manual, supra note 19, at 7.20.
139 OHoI REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.57(EX1).
140 See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
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5. Modification of the Periodic Payment Award
One area in which the state statutes agree is that of the possibility
of award modification. The majority of states, including Ohio, make no
provisions for adjustment of the periodic payments after judgment.14 ' The
legislators likely agreed with the drafters of the Model Act who had con-
sidered and had specifically left out a modification provision.
It was argued [at the committee meeting] that the insurance in-
dustry could not cost its product where a liability was open-
ended, court congestion would be worsened, and some injured
persons might be motivated to resist rehabilitation and recovery.
Difficulty in determining the cause of subsequent medical and
other changes in the tort victim were also cited. In short, the
[drafters] voted to abandon the suggestion because of the seem-
ingly intractable practical problems involved.
142
Proponents of award modification, however, assert that if the goal of
periodic payments is to make the claimant whole, then it is equitable and
necessary to allow adjustments in the award should the claimant's injuries
be more or less than expected. Such proponents assert that a typical
modification provision should provide that: (1) either side must request
the adjustment, (2) the adjustment can be an increase or a decrease, (3)
the court must be able to impose sanctions for bad faith or flagrant abuse
of the modification provision, and (4) the claimant must submit to a physical
examination if requested by the defendant.
143
6. Beneficial Rights
Although the amount of the periodic payment award may not be
modified during the claimant's life, most statutes allow adjustments after
his or her death. As to beneficial rights, the statutes are divided over
whether and to what extent a claimant's estate inherits the right to the
claimant's payments. Upon the death of the claimant, the need for medical
care and for non-economic losses (pain and suffering) terminates. Thus,
most state statutes provide that this portion of the payments end while
damages for future lost earnings continue. 1'
However, the states vary in their approach as to payment of the
141 Only the following six states allow any modification of periodic payment
plans after the judgment has been entered: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2619(DX1985);
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 667.7(bXl)(West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6864
(bX1986); 1985 Ill. Legis. Serv. 84-7 § 2-1709(2)(West); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§ 2951(2XBX1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-14-9.5(6X1987).
142 MODEL ACT, supra note 2, § 11 commentary, at 38.
141 Elligett, supra note 26, at 139.
'I" Since the need for medical care and pain and suffering terminate upon death,
continued payment of these items is a windfall to the recipient. MODEL ACT, supra
note 2, § 11 commentary, at 39. But if the claimant's family needs the anticipated
future earnings, they should be able to recover these damages. Elligett, supra note
26, at 141.
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remaining damage award. Five of the states pay the remaining in-
stallments for loss of future earnings as scheduled to the beneficiaries or
heirs of the claimant. 4 5 Four states make payments to the estate, either
as periodically scheduled 14 or after the award is converted to a lump sum. 147
The Model Act and an Illinois statute have complicated provisions1 48 which
award future damages to the beneficiaries of the claimant based upon the
wrongful death statutes. Several states make no provision for the death
of the claimant; however, in those states, state law generally provides that
any remainder left after the claimant dies passes to the claimant's estate. 49
The Ohio statute follows the majority of states. H.B. 327 terminates
the awards for future medical care and non-economic loss and pays the
installment as scheduled to the claimant's beneficiaries.
5
1
7. Reversionary Rights
With regard to reversionary rights, a minority of jurisdictions allow
a reversionary payment of the unpaid medical and non-economic losses
to the defendant's insurer should the claimant die prematurely.' 5' Pro-
ponents of reversionary rights assert that the reversion eliminates the need
for continued court involvement in the administration of the award and
prevents a windfall to beneficiaries.5 2 However, granting the defendant
a rebate if the claimant dies earlier than expected defeats the deterrence
goal of tort damages. For this reason, Ohio follows the majority of jurisdic-
tions which do not provide for reversionary rights.
IV. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
A. Advantages
The periodic payment statutes discussed in the previous section offer
great advantages to the defendant's insurer, the claimant, and the
defendant.
145 ALA. CODE § 6-5-486(3X1977); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 667.7(c)(West 1987);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.220(5)(Vernon 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-9.5(6)(1987);
Oo REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.57(F) (Baldwin 1988).
146 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2619(DX1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§ 2951(2XDX1987); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-109(dX1984).
147 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6864(bX1986).
MODEL ACT, supra note 2, § 11, at 35; 1985 Ill. Legis. Serv. 84-7 § 2-1713
(West).
141 These states are: Indiana, Kansas, New Mexico and South Carolina. Hindert,
Structured Settlements, supra note 106, at 59.
150 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.57(FX2).
151 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2619(DX1985); CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE § 667.7(c)(West
1987); MD. Cs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-109(dX1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 655.015
(West 1980 & Supp. 1987).
152 Elligett, supra note 26, at 141. Proponents advocate the use of two or more
annuities to fund the periodic payment judgment. This type of funding would
facilitate a reversion from one annuity with continued payments from the others.
Hilliard, supra note 4, at 7.
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1. Reduction of Medical Malpractice Insurance Costs
The greatest advantage of periodic payment judgments is the benefit
malpractice insurers gain from their use. If the liability payments are made
over time, insurers need not set aside large cash reserves for lump-sum
payments.153 Lower cash reserves result in lower malpractice premiums
and lower health care costs.1" The main purpose behind Ohio's medical
malpractice statute is to guarantee the availability of affordable medical
malpractice insurance.155 Ohio's periodic payment statute meets this goal
by lowering the cost of malpractice insurance thereby making it more
available.
2. Taxation
Another major benefit of periodic payment awards is the tax advan-
tage it affords the plaintiff. I.R.C. § 104(aX2) allows an income tax exclu-
sion for "the amount of any damages received [whether by suit or agree-
ment and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments] on account of
personal injuries or sickness.1 156 All the income earned on a lump sum
award is taxable to the claimant. 5 7 However, under a periodic payment
plan, I.R.C. § 104(aX2) gives the claimant an income tax exclusion for not
only the lump sum, but the interest appreciation as well.158 The only
exceptions5 9 to the tax-exempt status of damages under I.R.C. § 104(aX2)
153 See generally Elligett, supra note 26, at 146-47.
'5"Analysis, supra note 15, at 64. An insurance company can allow a recovery
to a claimant of up to 200-300% of the malpractice insurance limit while spending
only 95-96% of the limit. Whitinger, Periodic Payment Settlements - Friends In-
deed, 28 REs. GESTAE 75 (Aug. 1984). Periodic payments can save insurers as much
as 40-75% over lump-sum judgments resulting in lower costs to consumers. Elligett,
supra note 26, at 146-47.
151 See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
156 I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)(West Supp. 1987). To be excludable, damages must arise
from a tort action. Treas. Reg. 1.104-1(cX1970).
151 Rev. Rul. 65-29, 1965-1 C.B. 59.
158 Although I.R.C. § 104(aX2) applies only to federal income tax, the states
generally follow the federal code. See Winslow, Tax & Economic Considerations
in Structured Settlements, 35 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 59,60 (1984). Projecting to 1990
current trends in periodic payment plans, the total tax savings could amount from
$600 billion to $1 trillion. Halpern, supra note 51, at 18. However, the new 1988
tax reforms which reduce tax brackets make the tax savings less important. McNay,
The Other Side of Structured Settlements, 23 TRIAL 79 (May 1977) [hereinafter
McNay]. Additionally, critics argue that comparable tax-savings can be achieved
by investment of a lump sum award in tax-exempt state and local government
bonds. See, e.g., Analysis, supra note 15, at 64. However, the lump sum recipient
would receive a lower interest rate on the government bonds than the periodic pay-
ment plan recipient would receive with a regular bond or annuity. Hilliard, supra
note 4, at 12 n.46.
159 Future earnings have never been deemed income pursuant to I.R.C.
§ 61(aXWest 1987). Instead, the Internal Revenue Service excludes such earnings
because they are merely a measure of the harm from a personal injury. I.R.C.
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are medical expenses' and punitive damages.'
The defendant can also benefit from the tax treatment of periodic pay-
ment plans. First, if the defendant or his insurer finds it inconvenient to
continue paying the periodic payments over an extended time period, a
qualified assignment of the liability can be made to a major life insurance
company under I.R.C. § 130.162 The qualified assignment must be funded
with qualified funding assets such as annuities or United States obliga-
tions."'63 Additionally, I.R.C. § 162(a) may allow a current deduction to the
defendant of the amount actually invested to fund the periodic payments."
§ 61(aXWest Supp. 1987). See Roemer v. Comm'r, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983). See
also Rev. Rul. 85-97, 1985-2 C.B.50 (the entire damage amount received, including
the claim for lost wages, is excludable). There are six criteria for maintaining tax-
exempt status. The claimant must not have constructive receipt of current economic
benefits from the award. Rev. Rul. 65-29, 1965-1 C.B. 59; Rev. Rul. 79-220, 1979-2
C.B. 74. The claimant must have no ownership rights in the award. Ownership
rights include the right to change beneficiaries. Rev. Rul. 79-220, 1979-2 C.B. 74.
The defendant or the defendant's insurer must not set aside assets to secure pay-
ment of the plan. Rev. Rul. 79-313, 1979-2 C.B. 75. The claimant cannot possess
the ability to borrow against the annuity purchased to fund the plan. Rev. Rul.
65-29, 1965-1 C.B. 59. The claimant cannot possess the right to change the month-
ly payments. Rev. Rul. 79-313, 1979-2 C.B. 75. Finally, the claimant's rights against
the defendant, the defendant's insurer or qualified assignee for payments can be
no greater than those of a general creditor. Rev. Rul. 79-313, 1979-2 C.B. 75.
160 I.R.C. § 213 (West Supp. 1987) allows the taxpayer a deduction for medical
expenses paid during the taxable year to the extent the expenses exceed 7.5% of
adjusted gross income. See Rev. Rul. 75-220, 1975-1 C.B. 93, Rev. Rul. 75-232, 1975-1
C.B. 94 and Rev. Rul. 79-427, 1979-2 C.B. 120 for restrictions on medical expense
deductions.
161 Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426 (1955). See also Rev. Rul.
84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32 (Punitive damages are not an award on account of personal
injury. Rather such damages are awarded for the degree of the defendant's fault.).
See generally Jaeger, Owens & Fields, Taxability of Damages, 18 TAX ADVISOR 432
(July 1987).
12 I.R.C. § 130 (West Supp. 1987). See supra text accompanying note 45. In
order to make a valid qualified assignment of one's obligation to make periodic
payments due to an adverse personal injury judgment, six criteria must be met:(1) the assignee must elect to make a qualified assignment; (2) the assignee must
assume the defendant's liability; (3) the payments must be fixed as to the amount
and time of payments; (4) the assignee must not give the claimant rights greater
than a general creditor; (5) the assignee's obligation must be equal to that of the
defendant; and (6) the payments must be excludable under I.R.C. § 104(aX2). See
McKenney, Understanding Structured Settlements, 66 MICH. B.J. 610 (July 1987).
See also I.R.C. § 130(cXWest Supp. 1987).
Two life insurance companies currently accept qualified assignments. They are
Connecticut General Life and Transamerica Occidental Life. McNay, supra note
158, at 80.
163 I.R.C. § 130(dXWest Supp. 1987). United States obligations may be more
advantageous since the yield to maturity is higher than that available on an an-
nuity. Winslow, supra note 158, at 64.
' I.R.C. § 162(aXWest Supp. 1987) provides a deduction for ordinary and
necessary business expenses.
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3. Windfall Avoidance
The third major advantage of a periodic payment plan is that such plans
prevent a windfall to the claimant's family."6 5 Under a periodic payment
plan windfalls are prevented, because in a majority of states, the payments
attributable to future medical expenses and future pain and suffering are
terminated upon the death of the claimant. 166 Therefore, the the family
is not enriched by damage awards for future damages never incurred.'67
With a lump sum award, however, the potential for a windfall always ex-
ists because the jury must provide for future inflation and the claimant's
estimated life span.'6 8 If the claimant dies earlier than expected after receiv-
ing a lump sum award, his family receives money in payment for future
damages which the claimant will never incur.
4. Anti-Spendthrift Provisions
Another important advantage of periodic payment plans is that they
are anti-spendthrift in nature. In other words, payments spread over life
can prevent the claimant from wasting the award in the first few years
after judgment." 9 Most personal injury attorneys indicate an awareness
of cases where the claimant did not reap the long-term benefits the lump-
sum award was intended to provide because the money was spent for
unintended purposes soon after the trial. 70 The problem lies in the fact
that claimants prefer lump-sum settlements, but often misallocate the
award to present rather than future spending.'7 ' Studies show that 90%
of all major windfalls are squandered within five years.'7 2
165 See Elligett, supra note 26, at 131.
166 Plant, supra note 31, at 1332.
167 Elligett, supra note 26, at 131.
168 Roth, supra note 7, at 498. See also Analysis, supra note 15, at 64. Califor-
nia even included prevention of a windfall in the legislative intent of their periodic
payment statute. CAL. Cry. PRoc. CODE § 667.7(f)(West 1987). But see Rea, supra
note 16, at 143 (windfall argument is like claiming that unused life insurance policy
is a windfall to the insurance company).
9 Periodic payments prevent the claimant from wasting the award and becom-
ing a ward of the state. Roth, supra note 7, at 498.
"I Carestia, supra note 28. See also Krause, Structured Settlements for Tort
Victims, 66 A.B.A.J. 1527 (1980) [hereinafter Krause].
171 Rea, supra note 16, at 142-43.
1 Hilliard, supra note 4, at 249. Critics, however, dispute these statistics. If
the recipients ended up on welfare after squandering the money foolishly, then
the matter would be one for public concern. See Comm. Rep., supra note 22, at 23.
Other critics flatly deny the statistics. Such critics assert that people do not
foolishly treat personal injury awards like lottery winnings. Instead, successful
claimants utilize trusts and financial managers to help them conserve their awards.
See generally, Vertlieb, supra note 125.
Studies supporting this proposition have shown that the danger of dissipation
of lump sum awards is very real. According to James N. Morgan, Marvin Snider
and Marian Sobel of the Economic Behavior Program of the Survey Research Center
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Periodic payment plans solve the misallocation problem by paying the
claimant for damages as they occur. To prevent waste, the claimant will
receive the award in the same manner as he is accustomed to receiving
wage income, that is, periodically. 17
3
5. Freedom from Investment Concerns
Yet another benefit the claimant enjoys is freedom from investment
concerns.174 The injured claimant who receives a lump-sum award suddenly
finds himself having to decide how to invest the money. Many claimants
lack the financial knowledge to manage large amounts of money,'7 5 and
this lack of financial expertise is further complicated when the claimant
has suffered catastrophic injury which handicaps him physically, mental-
ly or emotionally. 176
The claimant can hire an investment counselor, however, claimants
who have suffered catastrophic injuries often do not have the presence of
mind to obtain professional financial advice. 77 The claimant is always in
danger of exposure to improvident advice and investments.178 Furthermore,
absent professional advice, the claimant's own family members may "in-
tentionally or incompetently mismanage the funds.' 1 79
Periodic payment judgments such as those contemplated by H.B. 327
solve the claimant's investment concerns and prevent him from squander-
ing the award because he is relieved of the investment burden. The defend-
ant or his insurer must decide how to invest what would have been the
claimant's lump sum award. The investment burden is thus placed where
it belongs, on the shoulders of the liable party. 8°
6. Flexibility of Plans Before Implementation
The defendant's investment burden has been lightened by periodic pay-
ment plan legislation, in that the defendant has tremendous flexibil-
of the University of Michigan, 40% of lump sum recipients did not conserve the
award to use it to replace lost future wages. Instead, the money was spent on pay-
ment of bills other than medical bills, payment of mortgages, purchase of furniture,
purchase of real estate and stocks, and investment in business. Plant, supra note
31, at 1331.
In the 1975 Tenth Annual Report of the Michigan Law Revision Commission,
recommendations were made that deferred payment awards in personal injury cases
be adopted. The report found that a few years after the judgment, personal injury
claimants often found themselves as public charges. Id at 1331-32.
17 Elligett, supra note 26, at 131-32.
174 See Comment, supra note 19, at 286.
'7 See MODEL ACT, supra note 2, Prefatory Note, at 3.
'7 Hilliard, supra note 4, at 238.
'I& at 250.
1 See MODEL ACT, supra note 2, Prefatory Note, at 3.
179 Eligett, supra note 26, at 132.
'" See Krause, supra note 170.
1988-89]
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
ity in shaping the plan.'81 As was mentioned earlier, one of the most flexi-
ble and most used funding tools for such plans is the annuity. 82 In sug-
gesting the use of annuities,'8 3 the Ohio statute encourages the bar to use
flexibility and imagination in payment plans.
7. Periodic Payment Plans Cost Less
Another benefit defendants receive through the periodic payment struc-
ture is the ability to pay huge future damage claims as they accrue.184 Fur-
thermore, defendants may utilize annuities to help meet future payments.
Generally, the defendant pays less for an annuity than he would for a lump
sum award. 185
However, some critics fear that the periodic payment judgment pro-
vides excessive benefits to the defendant. Since funding a payment plan
with an annuity costs less than payment of a lump sum award, the defend-
ant is in effect receiving leniency in his punishment.SB For this reason,
some critics assert that "periodic payments should be inapplicable to suits
involving intentional torts or punitive damages, since easing the burden
on the judgment debtor would decrease the deterrent effect.' 87
B. Disadvantages
Although periodic payment plans are a cavalier solution to the medical
malpractice crisis, they are not without problems. The disadvantages that
do exist, however, are minimal and are far outweighed by the advantages
of such plans. Such disadvantages that exist are described below.
1. Lack of Security for the Claimant
One disadvantage of periodic payment plans involves the security of
payments to the claimant. In a properly structured non-taxable plan, the
claimant has no greater rights than a general creditor of the liability in-
surer or assignor.'88 As a result, the claimant is last in line to receive pay-
181 Elligett, supra note 26, at 146. Periodic payment plans can be tailored to
the unique needs of those involved. Plant, supra note 31, at 1328.
182 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
's8 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
14 See generally Comm. Rep., supra note 22, at 21-22.
18 Customized Compensation, supra note 27, at 316. One expert estimates that
a periodic payout providing $30,000 per year for life, with twenty percent increases
in the payments every five years and a potential payout of $1,950,000 could be
purchased for $380,000. Comm. Rep., supra note 22, at 12.
18 See Corboy, supra note 8, at 1526.
187 Elligett, supra note 26, at 132.
188 See supra notes 159, 162.
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ment should the insurer or assignor end up in bankruptcy. 18 9 Thus, the
claimant is subject to a security risk since he will be a general creditor
of a commercial insurance institution years into the future.'O
A second security risk for the claimant is that of inflation. 9 ' A periodic
payment plan forces the claimant to bear all of the risk of inflation since
the annuities used in most plans are unresponsive to changes in the
economic climate. The claimant is locked into fixed payments and
defenseless against unforeseen future expenses.'92
These security risks are not fatal to periodic payment plans. Partial
remedies exist in careful drafting of the annuity contracts used to fund
the plans.193
2. Inflexibility of Plans after Implementation
One of the greatest disadvantages of periodic payment plans is inflex-
ibility after implementation which may leave the claimant without
recourse in meeting unforeseen expenses. 19 Failure to provide for modifica-
tion of the periodic payment plan after the judgment is ordered can be
detrimental to the claimant because: (1) the claimant may outlive the term
over which the damages accrue; or (2) the payments could fail to meet ac-
tual expenses if the claimant's medical condition worsens or inflation
outruns the fixed income."9 5 The first type of shortfall can be prevented
by the use of a life annuity or other payment for the claimant's lifetime.'
The second type of shortfall can be avoided by careful construction of the
plan. 197
With careful planning, shortfalls will not be a problem under the Ohio
statute. H.B. 327 allows the claimant and defendant to voluntarily sub-
mit a satisfactory and carefully constructed plan to the court for approval.
189 Halpern, supra note 51, at 83.
190 Compare Winslow, The Seven Most Common Questions About Structured
Settlements, 30 TRIAL LAW. GUmE 14, 25 (1986Xin only ten years, 1974 through
1984, almost two hundred casualty insurance companies were placed in conser-
vatorship, liquidation, receivership or bankruptcy) with McNay, supra note 158,
at 79 (bankruptcies are rare in the insurance business due to the large cash reserves
maintained).
1'1 Inflation reduces the purchasing power of money and dissipates the value
of an annuity. Comment, supra note 19, at 278.
192 I&
193The defendant's ownership and alienability rights may be restricted. Hilliard,
supra note 4, at 15. Should the claimant require even more security, counsel can
consider requiring transfer of the annuity into an irrevocable trust. The asset would
thereby be protected from creditors of the defendant in case of insolvency and the
claimant in case of misapplication of funds. Id
19 Comment, supra note 27, at 311 n.18.
195 See Payments, supra note 14, at 13.
196 Id
197 Id
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Every contingency can be met and addressed by providing for annual
percentage increases, fixed incremental increases, or deferred lump sums.198
Since the plaintiff assists in drafting the plan, he would hopefully have
few complaints about inflexibility in the future.
3. Value of Plan not Related to True Worth of Injury
Another disadvantage critics raise is that the value of the periodic pay-
ment plan bears no relation to the true damage of the injury. " Jury
damage awards are designed so that the claimant is compensated in an
amount equal to the seriousness of his injury. Under the common law, the
defendant is punished for his negligence by paying the present value of
the lump sum jury award. Critics assert that since purchasing an annuity
to fund a periodic payment plan is cheaper than paying the lump sum,
the defendant is not being punished in an amount equal to the jury's valua-
tion of the injury.200
Ohio's statute helps eliminate this problem by allowing the plaintiff
a chance to draft the type of plan desired. 0 1 As with problems of inflex-
ibility, the plaintiff should have few complaints if he understood the plan
he proposed.
4. Unavailability of Annuities
The recent development of periodic payment statutes raises the disad-
vantage of there being only a small market of annuities available to fund
the payment plans. In the majority of states, annuities are the favored
method to fund periodic payment judgments.21 2 In order to create unique,
flexible plans, annuities must provide payments which will take into ac-
count fluctuating inflation. Fear was expressed at the Model Act drafting
committee meetings that there would be no market for the type of annui-
ty needed to fund a periodic installment judgment adjustable over time.
But representatives of the banking industry indicated that a "market will
develop. '20
At this time there are already three insurance companies with Best's
highest ratings of quality and size which are writing annuities for periodic
198 McNay, supra note 158, at 79.
199 See generally, Broder, Structured Settlements: The Argument Against, 1981
PERS. INJ. ANN. 838 (1981).
200 These critics suggest that the claimant's attorney must demonstrate how
much less present value is than the total award. The court could even require an
affidavit from the claimant that he understands the figures. Id at 841. However,
the same requirements could be used for lump sum awards since they too are reduc-
ed to present value.
202 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.57(DX1Xa) (Baldwin 1988).
202 See supra notes 51, 52 and accompanying text.
202 MODEL ACT, supra note 2, § 7 commentary, at 22.
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payment judgments.0 4 In Ohio, more insurance companies will offer an-
nuities to satisfy the market created by the new periodic payment of
judgments act.
5. Constitutional Challenges
Examination of the constitutional aspect of periodic payment awards
raises various due process, equal protection and right to jury trial
challenges to such plans at both the state and federal levels. The due pro-
cess challengers argue that use of a periodic payment award reduces the
value of the claimant's award without a corresponding quid pro quo. 20 5 The
equal protection challengers assert that the periodic payment of large
judgments unduly imposes the burden of reducing malpractice insurance
costs on a class of seriously injured claimants, while unreasonably
benefiting the class of medical malpractice defendants.2 °6 Finally, in states
where the court, rather than the jury, is given the task of fashioning the
terms of the periodic payment plan, the challengers allege that the court
is removing from the jury its constitutional obligations to fix damages. 207
Despite such challenges, the majority of states have upheld the con-
stitutionality of periodic payment statutes. 2 8 In Ohio, no direct consti-
204 The three insurance companies are: (1) Prudential Insurance Company of
America; (2) Metropolitan Life Insurance Company; and (3) Equitable Life Insurance
Company. Other companies offer bargain rates by usir_, investments in junk bonds,
and should be avoided. Kelner & Kelner, Tort Reform & Periodic Installment
Payouts, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 8, 1986, at 1, col 1.
2105 See American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 36 Cal.3d 359, 683
P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984), vacating, 33 Cal.3d 674, 660 P.2d 829, 190
Cal. Rptr. 371 (1983). A woman hospitalized for brain surgery fell or fainted in
a shower stall and suffered severe burns as a result of overheated water. The
hospital , ved for periodic payment of the $200,000 verdict under CAL. Civ. Pnoc.
CODE § 667.7 ('West 1987). The court denied the motion, concluding that the Califor-
nia statute was violative of due process and equal protection. The California
Supreme Court originally agreed, but later reversed the decision,.finally holding
that the statute was rationally related to a legitimate state interest, the claimant
had no vested property rights in the payment style of damages, and the legislature
has broad authority to modify the nature of the damages. Id
206 See Comm. Rep., supra note 22, at 14. The court in Carson v. Maurer, 120
N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980) struck down the statutory scheme of periodic
payments on the ground that the statute unduly burdened seriously injured
claimants with future damages greater than $200,000 while unreasonably favor-
ing health care defendants. Id at 944, 424 A.2d at 838.
But see Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978) which held that the en-
tire medical malpractice act was unconstitutional because key provisions were in-
valid, but the periodic payment portion itself was valid.
207 FIRST ANNUAL, supra note 41, at 134.
208 See Comm. Rep., supra note 22, at 13-14. Community Hosp., 36 Cal.3d at
359, 683 P.2d at 670, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 671, held there was no equal protection
violation because the statute was a reform measure being enacted one step at a
time. Accord Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal.3d 137,695 P.2d 665,211
Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985); Craven v. Crout, 163
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tutional attack has yet been made due to the fact that the statute has on-
ly recently been enacted.
Furthermore, the closest analogy to cases which might attack the
periodic payment statutes are those cases addressing the constitutionali-
ty of the-previous $200,000 limit on general damages in medical malprac-
tice claims. Although several lower Ohio appellate courts were in the
minority of jurisdictions in holding the $200,000 limitation unconstitu-
tional, 0 9 the Ohio Supreme Court has followed the majority of states in
upholding other provisions of the original medical malpractice act,21 0 and
it is likely it will follow the majority of states in upholding the periodic
payment statute as well.
V. CONCLUSION
In summary, it is apparent that the modern trend in the majority of
jurisdictions has been to uphold the periodic payment award as a viable
alternative to the traditional lump sum award. Proponents of such plans
advocate their use as a solution to the medical malpractice crisis because
of the distinct advantages to insurers, claimants and defendants.
Due to the fact that payments are made periodically rather than in
a lump sum, insurers can keep less cash on reserve, thereby freeing more
capital for investment. The claimant is benefited by periodic receipt of tax
exempt payments. Furthermore, the equitable periodic nature of the
payments prevents the claimant from spending the award too quickly, and
allows the court to terminate portions of the award when the need for those
damages ceases.
Benefits accrue to the defendant as well. The flexibility of such plans
allow the parties to design a unique plan which will be less costly for the
defendant than a lump sum award. Additionally, the defendant may be
Cal. App.3d 779, 209 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1985); Bernier v. Burris, 113 I1l.2d 219, 497
N.E.2d 763 (1986); State ex. reL Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis.2d 491, 261 N.W.2d
434 (1978).
209 The first Ohio case challenging the recovery limit held that the limit con-
ferred an unreasonable benefit on medical malpractice defendants not available
to other defendants, and thus, violated equal protection. Graley v. Satayatham,
74 Ohio Op.2d 316, 343 N.E.2d 832 (1976). The next case which addressed the issue
suggested that the limit on recovery violated due process protections because it
removed the common law right to full redress without a quid pro quo. Simon v.
St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op.3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (1976). But cf
Keeton v. Mansfield Obstetrics & Gynecology Assn., No. C80-1573A, slip op. at
27 (N.D. Ohio March 5, 1981XU.S. District Court upheld the constitutionality of
the recovery limit and disagreed with Simon). The most recent case held that the
recovery limit violates both due process and equal protection guarantees. Duren
v. Suburban Community Hosp., 24 Ohio Misc.2d 495, 495 N.E.2d 51 (1985).
2.0 The main Ohio Supreme Court case dealing with the constitutionality of
the medical malpractice act addressed only the mandatory arbitration provision
which it upheld. Beatty v. Akron City Hosp., 67 Ohio St.2d 483, 424 N.E.2d 586
(1981).
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able to deduct his cost of funding the plan as a business deduction.
More specifically, in Ohio, H.B. 327 will be embraced by imaginative
attorneys attempting to promote the best interests of their client at trial.
Although H.B. 327 does not mirror the Model Act, Ohio's legislators have
developed a unique plan by combining their innovations with the most
significant provisions utilized by the majority of states. After reviewing
the current periodic payment legislation enacted by the majority ofjurisdic-
tions and the reaction of the bar, economists, and insurers to such legisla-
tion, one must conclude that periodic payment awards will become the rule
in the area of medical malpractice.

